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FILED - iCOPY
MAR 3 I 2008
Supreme court _ _ court of l\jljlta/s
EnteredonATSby:_ -

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
JOHN E. EWING, and NOREEN EWING,
Appellants,

vs.

DOCKET NO. 34541

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the 1st Judicial District for Kootenai County.
Honorable Charles Hosack, District Judge presiding.
Michael J. Verbillis
Residing at Coeur d'Alene, ID for Appellants.
Michael E. Kelly
Residing at Boise, ID for Respondent.
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III.

INTRODUCTION
As anticipated, Respondent has attempted to walk the thin line between commending the
Trial Court for it's wisdom in ushering Mr. Ewing to the exit doorofthe courthouse on the thin basis
of the Recreational Use Statute, while simultaneously urging that the Trial Court committed error
by not tossing the case out of court based upon the notion that Mr. Ewing was somehow a statutory
employee of the State ofidaho when he was injured.
1.

The Trial Court Incorrectly Ruled that the Recremtional Use Statute is Applicable to
the Case at Bar.
The Trial Court and Respondent before this Court take the position that Mr. Ewing was

"recreating" when he was seriously injured falling in a poorly compacted area following underground
plumbing activities at Mineral Mountain Rest Area. This holding and subsequent rhetoric of
Respondent is singularly based upon the placement of a "picnic table" within the confines of the
Mineral Mountain Rest Area property. The logic spins thus: even though Ewing was at work and
taking a break from his work day to sit down and have quick bite of lunch or to use the public
facilities, at that precise moment, he was "recreating." Thus, the State is shielded by the
Recreational Use Statute. Idaho Code §36-1604.

It appears as though the Trial Court and

Respondent have analyzed the applicable case law as requiring an examination as to the purpose or
intention of the user of the property at the moment of injury.
As Respondent states:
This Court held that the Recreational Use Statute requires only that the recreational
user use the owner's property for recreational purposes.

Respondent's Brief, pg. 9-10.
For the Trial Court to rnle as a matter oflaw, that the momentary break from the day's toils
to have a snack is "recreation," constitutes an end rnn on the role of the jury. Shouldn't Mr. Ewing
be entitled to allow a jury to determine whether or not he was on the property for the purpose of
recreating, rather than the Trial Court and the Deputy Attorney General?
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Let us imagine, for a moment, a parallel universe in which a statute, not unlike Idaho's
Recreational Use Statute, has a long laundry list of activities that are considered recreational in their
basic purpose and this law includes "bird watching" as a listed activity. Let's suppose that a person,
not unlike John Ewing, is working on a project, not unlike the one in the case at bar, and he leaves
his work site to enter the adjacent prope1iy (coincidentally owned by the same property owner). Let
us further suppose this person in this parallel universe spots a robin, a common first sign of Spring.
Again, to carry this analogous fact pattern one step further, image that this person then, after briefly
glancing at the robin, steps in a similar soft spot ofland and has injuries, not unlike Ewing. Would
the Trial Court and thus the Attorney General argue that since the purpose for which Mr. Ewing
entered the property was to watch birds, he, therefore, is barred from bringing an action?
The Undersigned humbly submits that the answer to the preceding rather hyperbolic analogy
is quite simple and straight forward. BaiTing Mr. Ewing from submitting his case to the jury in this
case does violence to the purpose of the statute and elevates sophistry to jurisprudence.
Simply put, Mr. Ewing is entitled to let a jury determine for what purpose he was entering
this property and not have improper inferences indulged by the Trial Court and Respondent.

2.

John Ewing was not the Statutory Employee of the State of Idaho, Department of
Transportation When He was Injured.
The briefing to this Court is not radically different thai1 the briefing to the Trial Court on this

question. Notwithstai1ding the skilled efforts of counsel for Respondent to mischaracterize the
players in this draina, it's logic also fails.
The analysis of catego1y 1 and category 2 statutory employer/employee status under Idaho
Code §72-223 is really quite simple. If an employee is injured on the job and his immediate
employer has no worker's compensation, but the prime contractor on the job has worker's
compensation coverage, then that contractor becomes the statutory employer. It is an imputed
relationship that the legislature has placed upon contractors to see to it that those subcontractors
working under them have the financial responsibility to insure their workmen. In the event such
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subcontractors do not provide such coverage, the law will impose that burden on the prime
contractor. It is thus social policy enacted by the legislature to insure that injured workers will not
go uncompensated by reason of the fiscal irresponsibility of their immediate employer. Id.
As indicated in previous briefing to this Court, before the 1996 Amendment to the Statute,
an injured worker was free to sue his statutoiy employer whether or not there existed worker's
compensation in the chain of contractors, if there was an independent basis in tort. Runcorn v.
Shearer Lumber Prods., 107 Idaho 389,690 P.2d 324 (1984). The 1996 Amendment to the Statute

changed all of that and made it clear that those prime contractors were deemed immune from suit,
hence, the term categmy 1 statutory employer. Venters v. Sorrento Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245,
180 P.3d 392 (2005).
The definition of a category 2 statutory employer is a bit more elusive. The statute
immunizes owners or lessees of premises who are virtually the proprietor, operator of the business
there carried on, etc. Thus the question becomes, who is the owner, lessee, or virtual proprietor of
the business endeavor.
Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 76 P.3d. 951 (2003) made it clear that a retail

establishment not in the ordinary business of construction or roofing activities was not a virtual
proprietor. As the Court articulated the test:
To determine who is a virtual proprietor or operator, the Court must consider whether
the work being done pertains to the business, trade, or occupation of the owner or
proprietor and whether such business, trade, or occupation is being caiTied on by it
for pecuniary gain. Id. "Generally, to find a business or person to be a statutoiy
employer, the work being carried out by the independent contractor on the owner or
proprietor's premises must have been the type that could have been carried out by
employees of the owner or proprietor in the course ofits usual trade or business." Id.
In sho1i, "if a person is normally equipped with manpower and tools to do a job and
nevertheless contracts it to another employer, he is the statutory employer of the
second employer's employees."
139 Idaho 207 at 212.

Thus one could say that a category 2 statutory employer is a "virtual" employer. This
relationship is created by operation of the statute. Respondent has cited the same cases that
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Appellant has cited on this topic and made an argument much like the one that was made to the Trial
Comi.
Missing from their briefing before the Trial Court and in the Trial Court's analysis was the
recent case of Cordova v. Bonneville County Joint School District No. 93, Supreme Court docket
no. 3 I 188 (7 /3 J/07). In Cordova the appellant was an employee of School District #91. She was
assigned to a behavioral support division, which involved her traveling to various schools. During
a school outing at a ski lodge, Ms. Cordova was injured while conducting a "rope/confidence" course
designed to build cohesiveness and tiust among the various students of School District #93.
Following her injury, Ms. Cordova sued School District 93. She had received worker's
compensation from District 91, her direct employer. District 93 took the position that she was a
statutory employee under Idaho Code §72-223 and, accordingly, could not sue the school district (93)
for whom she was not a direct employee. The Court reasoned, she was clearly not a category 1
employee under a plain reading of the statute. With respect to whether or not she could be
considered a category 2 statutory employee, the Court said:
We conclude that District 93 is not conducting a business; it is not engaged in
activity for the purpose of"livelihood;" and operating a school is not a commercial
activity. Furthermore, there is no evidence that District 93 is receiving any pecuniary
gain in connection with operating the school. Thus, because District 93 is not a
"business" in the ordinary meaning of the word, it cannot be Cordoba's category 2
statutory employer. Id.
Again, the Trial Court reasoned without citing this particular case as it was not pivotal.
Notably, it is not cited by Respondent in it's brief before this Court.
Simply stated, the Cordova case puts an end to any notion that John Ewing could in any way
be considered the statutory employee of the Idaho Department of Transportation. Like the School
District, the Highway District is not in the bnsiness of making money or even attempting to do so.
Absent Cordova, the analysis of Respondent still misses the mark. The notion, that the
owner of the prope1iy who hires a prime contractor can be a category 2 statutory employer, does not
hold water. The State ofidaho is no more the category 2 statutory employer of John Ewing than a
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homeowner who hires a contractor to remodel his house, who, in turn, hires a painting subcontractor
where the painting subcontractor's employee becomes injured. The homeowner, like the retailer in
the Robison case does not typically engage in remodeling contracts. Thus, he cannot be deemed a
category 2 statutory employer.
IV.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted for the reasons herein stated and in the prior
briefing of Appellant, this case should be remanded for a jury trial on the merits so that Mr. Ewing
can have his opportunity to prove that on the day that he fell due to faulty workmanship on a project

unrelated to his work site he was not "recreating." There is no statutmy employer relationship
present in this case. He cannot be deemed as category 1 statutory employer by virtue of the plain
ordinary meaning of the statute. Under the holding in Cordova, the State ofidaho cannot be deemed
a category 2 statutory employer by virtue of the nonpecuniary nature ofIDT's endeavors.
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